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720 BURDETTE tJ. ROLLEFSON CONSTRUCTION CO. [52 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 25405. In Bank. Oct. 5, 1959.] 
DOROTHY M. BURDETTE ct al., Appcnant~, v. ROfJLEI<'-
SON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (a Corporation) 
-et al., Respondents. 
[1] Landlord and Tenant-Injuries to Tenant-Contributory Neg-
ligence.-In an action for injuries sustained by a tenant in 
falling to the public sidewalk froUl SOUle point between the 
top of 10 steps from the public sidewalk and the door of her 
apartment, to which access from the top of such steps could 
be obtained only by traversing a private sidewalk for 30 or 
40 feet and then climbing an -additional four steps to a plat- , 
form immediately outside the front door of the apartment, 
where the tenant had no memory of what occurred after she 
closed the door until she found herself back in her apartment 
after the accident, and where there were no eyewitnesses to the 
accident, the trial court properly found that the tenant was not 
guilty of contributory negligence. The only reasonable infer-
ence was that the tenant lost her footing and then tumbled 
down the steep embankment to the public sidewalk below and 
that a guard rail would have prevented her tumbling to the 
public sidewalk whether or not it would have prevented her 
initial loss of footing. 
[2] IeL-Injuries to Tenant-Necessity for Guard Rails.-In an 
action for injuries sustained by a tenant in falling to the public 
sidewalk from some point between the top of 10 steps from the 
public sidewalk and the door of her apartment, to which access I 
from the top of such steps could be obtained only by traversing 
a private sidewalk for 30 or 40 feet and then climbing an 
additional four steps to a platform immediately outside the 
front door of the apartment, where a municipal building code 
section required a guard rail "Where a floor . • • or deck is 
accessible from a stairway or doorway and the floor ••. or deck 
is more than four feet (4') above the adjoining ground or 
floor level," and where the private sidewalk was accessible 
from a stairway and on one side it was 15 to 18 feet above the 
adjoining ground level, it was this lower adjoining ground 
level, not the ground level on which the private walk resterl 
and which adjoined it on the other side, that was relevant to 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Buildings, § 5 et seq.; Am.Jur., Buildings, 
§ 3 et seq. 
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Landlurd and Tenant, § 137; [2] 
!.andlord and Tenant, § 135; [3-5] Buildings, § 1.1; [6] Appeal 
and Error, § 119; [7] Landlord and Tenant, § 138(3). 
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the application of the code section, since it was there that the 
danger lay, and it was immaterial that an agreed statement 
of facts described the private walk as being at ground level. 
[3] Buildings-Municipal Ordinances or Codes-Construction.-A 
private agreement between the pal·ties as to the definition of 
"adjoining ground level," as used in a municipal ordinance or \ 
building code section, could not control the interpretation of 
such ordinance or section. . 
[4] Id.-Municipal Ordinances or Codes-Construction.-A private 
sidewalk was a "floor .•. or deck" within the meaning of a 
municipal ordinance or building code section requiring a guard 
rail where a floor or deck is accessible from a stairway or door-
way and the floor or deck is more than 4 feet above the ad-
joining ground or floor level, where the private sidewalk was 
a flat space exposed to the open air and it was a platform of 
the building on which to walk, thereby resembling a ship's 
deck in that it was a distinct level area adjoining the building 
between the floor level above and the ground level below. 
[5] Id.-Municipal Ordinances or Codes-Construction.-Under a 
municipal ordinance or building code section requiring all 
traffic lanes to be enclosed by guard rails when a floor or deck 
accessible to a door or stairway is more than 4 feet above the 
adjoining ground level, a private sidewalk leading from the 
floor of a platform outside the door of an apartment house 
to the flight of 10 steps to a public sidewalk is a "traffic lane." 
Since the code section does not provide that the guard rails 
may terminate where the traffic lane reaches the edge of the 
immediate level accessible to the door or stairway, the only 
reasonable interpretation is that the rails must continue 
until the traffic lane reaches a safe level or terminates. A 
railing that is not coterminous with the peril against which it 
guards may be more dangerous than none at all. 
[6] Appeal-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Ca.se.-.<\ lthough 
ordinarily a pal·ty may not deprive his opponent of oppor-
tunity to meet an issue in the trial court by changing his theory 
on appeal, this rule does not apply ""'hen the facts are not 
disputed and the party mercly raises a new question of law. 
[7] Landlord and Tenant--Injuries to Tenant--Evidence.-In an 
action for injuries sustained by a tenant in .falling to the 
public sidewalk from some point between the top of 10 steps 
from the public sidewalk and the door of her apartment, to 
which access from the top of such steps could be obtained 
only by traversing a private sidewalk for 30 or 40 feet and 
then climbing an additional four steps to a platform imme-
[6] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 142. 
o 
diately outside the front door of the Ilpartm('ut, the trial i 
court's finding that ddendants' negligence was not the proxi- ' 
mate cause of the tenant's injuries could not be sustained, not-
.withstanding the langunge of an agreed statement that there 
was no evidence in the record showing or tending to show the 
. cause of the injuries, where the only reasonable conclusion 
that could be drawn was that such language referred only 
to the absence of direct evidence of the cause of the injuries 
or of the cause of the tenant's initial loss of footing, where 
the only inference that could reasonably be drawn from the 
record was that a guard rail would have prevented the tenant's 
injuries, and where, assuming that such finding could be ex-
plained by the theory that defendants were n~gligent only in 
failing to provide guard rails for the platform and stairway, 
it appeared as a matter of law that they were also negligent 
in failing to provide a railing for the private sidewalk, that 
the tenant fell at one of those three places, and that a railing 
would have prevented her from tumbling to the public side-
walk. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. McIntyre Faries, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained by a 
tenant in falling to a public sidewalk from some point between 
the top of 10 steps from the public sidewalk and the door of her 
apartment. Judgment for defendants reversed. 
Joseph Schecter for Appellants. 
Crider, Tilson & Ruppe, Henry E. Kappler, Milton M. 
Cohen and Patti Sacks Karger for Respondents . 
. TRAYNOR, J .-Plaintiffs appeal from the judgment in 
favor of defendants after a trial before the court without 
a jury in an action to recover damages for personal injuries 
sustained by Dorothy M. Burdette (hereinafter referred to 
as "plaintiff") in falling to the public sidewalk from a point 
outside her apartment. 
The appeal is on an agreed statement of facts. Defendant 
Hischemoeller, the owner of a lot located at 11305 Biona 
Drive in the city of Los Angeles, and defendant Rollefson 
Construction Company (hereinafter referred to as "Rollef-
son") entered into an agref'ment wherein Rollefson was to 
erect a six-unit apartment building on the lot. Rollefson 
was to participate either in the profit fl'Olll a sale of the 
C) 
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property or in the rental incollH', in li(~u of a jll·ufi!. oVl'r anll ; 
above the actual cost or construction of the bl\ildill~. Shortly 
before the building was completed, plaintiff and her husband 
leased apartment 2 for a one-year term. Defendants had not 
. procured a certificate of occupancy when the Burdettes moved 
ill on .October 1, 1956. 
The apartment building is situated at the summit of a steep 
hill that rises 15 to 18 feet above the public sidewalk. To enter 
plaintiff's apartment, it is necessary to leave the public side-
walk, climb a flight of 10 steps, make a right-angle turn, 
traverse a private sidewalk that follows the edge of the hill 
for 30 or 40 feet, and climb a flight of four steps to a platform 
immediately outside the front door of the apartment. No part 
of the platform, private sidewalk, or either set of stairs was 
enclosed by protective guard rails at the time of the accident. 
[1] On October 10, 1956, plaintiff, accompanied by a 
friend, was preparing to leave her apartment. She held the 
door open for her friend and paused to close the door. The: 
friend had almost reached the top of the flight of 10 steps ' 
leading to the public sidewalk when she heard plaintiff's cries, 
turned, and saw plaintiff lying upon the public sidewalk. 
Plaintiff has no memory of what occurred after she closed 
the door until she found herself back in her apartment after . 
the accident. Thus, there were no eyewitnesses to the accident, \ 
and the tridl court properly found that plaintiff was not guilty 
of contributory negligence. (Scott v. Burke, 39 Ca1.2d 388, 
394 [247 P.2d 313] ; Gigl·iotti v. Nunes, 45 Ca1.2d 85, 93 [286 
P.2d 809] ; Oampagna v. Market St. By. 00., 24 Ca1.2d 304, 
309 [149 P.2d 281] ; Gallichotte v. Oalif01·n-ia Mut. etc. Assn., 
4 Cal.App.2d 503, 508 [41 P.2d 349].) Under these circum-
stances the only reasonable inference is that plaintiff lost her 
footing and then tumbled down the steep embankment to the 
public sidewalk below and that a guard rail would have pre-
vented her tumbling to the public sidewalk whether or not 
it would have prevented her initial loss of footing. The crucial 
issue, therefore, is whether or not the accident occurred at a 
place where defendants were under a duty to provide n 
guard rail. • 
Deft!ndants contend that the Building Code of the city of 
Los Angeles required guard rails only for the platform and the 
four steps leading to it, and that since the accident may have 
occurred after plaiutiff reached the private sidewalk, she 
has failed to prove that defendants' Il<:,gligence in 110t pro-
C) 
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viding guard rails for the platform and stairs caused her 
injury.! 
Plaintiff contends that the building codc required guard 
"rails for the private sidewalk as well as the stairs and plat-
form, and that since she fell either from the platform, the 
"flight of four steps, or the private sidewalk, defendants' neg-
Iigenc"e in not providing any guard rails was necessarily the 
proximate cause of her injuries. 
It is conceded that section 91.3305(g) of the building code 
required guard rails for the platform and the flight of four 
steps. [2] The dispute centers about the applicability of 
section 91.4404 (a), which provides: "Guard Rails Required. 
Where a floor, roof or deck is accessible from a stairway or 
doorway and the floor, roof or deck is more than four feet (4') 
above the adjoining ground or floor level, a protective guard 
rail shall be provided in such a manner as to separate com-
pletely the doorway from the edge of the floor, roof or deck 
and also enclose all traffic lanes and all equipment requiring 
periodic servicing." This section was enacted "to safeguard 
life and limb" (Building Code, § 91.0315) by preventing 
persons from falling from dangerously high horizontal sur-
faces to which they have access from doorways or stairways, 
and it must be interpreted to promote its purpose. The private 
sidewalk was accessible from a stairway, and on one side it 
was 15 to 18 feet above the adjoining ground level. It was 
this lower adjoining ground level, not the ground level on 
which the private walk rested and which adjoined it on the 
other side, that was relevant to the application of the section, 
for it was there that the danger lay. Thus, it is immaterial 
that the agreed statement described the private walk as being 
at ground level, for the photographs make clear that the 
ground level referred to in the agreed statement was not that 
of the public sidewalk below but that of the adjoining apart-
ment building on which the private walk also rested. [3] More-
over, even had the parties intended in the agreed statement 
to define" adjoining ground level" within the meaning of the 
ordinance, thE.'ir private agreement could not control its 
'This theory was apparently adopted by the trial court. Thus, after 
finding that the absence of guard rails around the platform and the 
flight of four steps was a violation of the Builtling Code, the court went 
on to find that" ..• it is untrue that the absence of snid hanurailM or 
guardrails or the presence of any dangerous or hazardous condition for 
which defendants, or either of them, were responsible or aceountable, was 
a direct or proximate cause of any fall or other incident which causeu 
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interpretation. (See Desny v. Wilder, 46 Ca1.2d 715, 729 [29!J 
P.2d 257] ; San Fra-l1ci.sco humber 00. v. Bibb, 139 Cal. 325, 
326 [73 P. 864].) 
[4] Defendants contend, however, that the private sidc-
\mlk \\'as not a "floor ... or deck" within the meaning of the 
ordinance. "Deck" has been defined as "a flat space, re-
sembling or likened to a ship's deck, esp. when exposed to 
the open air; ... " (Webster's New International Dietionary, 
2d ed., 1941, p. 680.) "Floor" has been defined as "The 
surface, or the platform, of a structure on which to walk, work, 
or travel; ... " (Webster's New International Dictionary, 
Sltpra, at p. 970.) The private sidewalk was a flat space ex-
posed to the open air, and it was a platform of the building 
on which to walk. It resembled a ship's deck in that it was 
a distinct level area adjoining the building between the floor 
level above and the ground level below. Like a ship's prome-
nade deck bordered by ship's cabins on one side and the 
ship's side on the other, it was dangerous if it lacked a railing 
at its e<:Ige. Although it might usually be described as a 
sidewalk, it was also a "floor ... or deck" within the meaning 
of the ordinance reasonably construed to promote its manifest 
objectives. 
[5] The private sidewalk was also a "traffic lane" leading 
from the floor of the platform outside the door to the flight 
of 10 steps. Section 91.4404(a) requires all traffic lanes to 
be enelosed by guard rails when a floor or deck accessible to 
a door or stairway is mOJ:e than 4 feet above the adjoining 
ground level. It does not provide that the guard rails may 
terminate where the traffic lane reaches the edge of the 
immediate level accessible to the door or stairway, and the 
only reasonable interpretation is that the rails must continue 
until the traffic lane reaches a safe level or terminates. Other-
wise the ordinance would sanction a trap. A guard rail 
begets reliance, and it.'l termination suggests safety. A rail-
ing that is not coterminous with the peril against which it 
guards may he more dangerous than none at aU. (See La-ir<l 
v. T. W. Mather, 111 C., 51 Ca1.2d 210, 216,218 [331 P.2d 617].) 
Defendants contend, however, that the ('ourt eannot apply 
section 91.4404(a) -to the fads of this ('a~e, 011 the ground 
t]lut to do so wOlIl(l pt'rmit. plaintiff to (·hange the theory of 
her case on aplwa1. This cOlIl"ntioll is wilhout mel'it. [6] Al-
thougb orJiwu'ily a pal'!y may 1I0t d"'pri\'e his opponent of all 
opportunity to meet an issue in the tI'ial .'ourt by changing 
C) 
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his theory on appeal, this rule does not apply when, as in 
·this casc, the facts are not disputed and the party merely 
. raises a new question of law. (Ward v. Taggarl, 51 Ca1.2d 
736,742 [336 P.2d 534] ; Panopulos v. Maderis,47 Ca1.2d 337, 
340-341 [303 P.2d 738].) 
[7] Defeudants contend that the trial court's finding that 
their negligence was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's 
injuries is supported by the language of the agreed statement 
that "there is no evidence in the entire record showing or 
tending to show the cause of plaintiff's injuries." As we have 
seen, however, there is evidence that compels the conclusion 
that one cause of plaintiff's injuries was the absence of a guard 
rail at the place she fell. We cannot assume that by including . 
the quoted language in the agreed statement, plaintiff agreed 
that her appeal was without merit and that we should dis-
regard the record. (Palmer v. City of Long Beach, 33 Ca1.2d 
134, 144 [199 P.2d 952].) The only reasonable conclusion 
that can be drawn from the record is that the quoted language 
refers only to the absence of direct evidence of the cause of 
the injuries or of any evidence of the cause of plaintiff's 
initial loss of footing. To interpret it to mean that there is 
no evidence that a guard rail would have prevented plaintiff's; 
tumbling to the public sidewalk 15 to 18 feet below would : 
render the agreed statement self-stultifying, for the only in- i 
ference that can reasonably be drawn from the record is that ' 
a guard rail would have prevented plaiutiff's injuries. The 
trial court's finding that defendants' negligence was not the 
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries may be explained by its 
theory, apparently acquiesced in by plaintiff below, that de-
fendants were negligent only in failing to provide guard 
r~ for the platform and stairway and that there was no 
evidence that plaintiff did not fall from the private sidewalk. 
Since it appears as a matter of law, however, that defendants 
were negligent in failing to provide a railing for the platform, 
the stairway, and the private sidewalk, that pJaintiff fell at 
one of those three places, and that a railing would have pre-
vented her tumbling to the public sidewalk, the trial court's 
finding that defendants' negligence was not the proximate 
cause of her injuries cannot be sustained. (Bisgett v. S01tth 
S.P. Belt Ry. Co .• 67 Ca1.App. 325. 328 [227 P. 6711 ; Murray 
v. Southern Pacific Co .• ]77 Cal. 1. 10 [169 P. 6751 ; 1'myle71 
v. Citraro, 112 Cal.App. 172, 174-175 [297 P. 649J [heal"ing 
denied by this court] ; Edgar v. Citraro, ]12 Cal.App. 178, 180 
[297 P. 654] [hearing denied by this eourt]; Gallichotte v. 
o 
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Cali.fornia Mut. etc. A~SIl., 4 Cal.App.2d 503, 507-509 [41 
P.2d 349] ; Hes.~ion v. City &- County of San Francisco, 122 
Cal.App.2d 592, 603 [265 P.2d 542] j Alarid v. Vanier, 50 
.. Cal.2d 617, 621 [327 P.2d 897].) 
The judgment of the trial court is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., and Peek, J. pro tem.,· concurred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. The majority opinion, in my 
view, reaches an anomalous result. 
First, it is conceded by the plaintiff in the agreed state-
ment of fact that there is no evidence in the entire recoru 
showing or tending to show the cause of plaintiff's injuries. 
Second, the record discloses a total absence of any evi-
dence as to how the accident occurred. The record merely 
reveals that plaintiff testified that "she stepped out of the 
door on to the platform, turned so that she faced the door, 
and claims that the last thing she remembers is pulling the 
door closed. She claims that the next thing she knew she 
was in her own apartment, which was after the accident had 
occurred, and after she had been injured." 
Hence, we have the novel result of the majority opinion 
disregarding the established rule that every intendment and 
presumption not contradicted by or inconsistent with the 
record on appeal must be indulged in favor of the judgment of 
the trial court. (4 Cal.Jur.2d (1952), Appeal and Error, 
§ 559, p. 426; § 571, p. 444.) 
In place of this rule, the majority opinion disregards the 
finding of the trial court that defendant's alleged negligence 
was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. In place 
of such finding, it speculates "that plaintiff fell at one of 
those three places, and that a railing would have prevented 
her tumbling to the public sidewalk." This, of course, over-
looks the long established rule that the burden is upon the 
plaintiff to introduce evidence proving the proximate causal 
connection between the injury or damage com,plained of and 
the alleged negligence of the defendant. It is not sufficient 
that a negligent act of the defendant might have been the 
proximate cause of the accident. (35 Ca1.Jur.2d (1957), 
Negligence, § 71, p. 577.) 
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court, with an 
opinion reading thus: 
Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment in favor of defendants 
• Assigned by ChairDl:ul of Judicial Council. 
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after trial before the court without a jury in an action to : 
recover damages for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff 
Dorothy Burdette (hereinafter referred to as "plaint~") 
"from a fall onto a public sidewalk in front of the apartment 
in which she lived . 
. Facts: The present appeal is upon an agreed statement of i 
. facts, which discloses that defendant HischemoeUer was the '[ 
owner of a lot at 11305 Biona Drive, West Los Angeles. He, 
entered into an agreement with defendaut Rollefson COll- . 
struction Company (hereinafter referred to as "Rollefson"), 
wherein Rollefson was to erect a six-unit apartment building 
on the lot. 
After the bnilding had been completed, Rollefson was to 
participate in either the profit from the sale of the property 
or a portion of the income from the property in lieu of a 
profit over and above the actual cost of erecting the buildiug. 
When the building was nearing completion, apartment 2 
was leased to plaintiff and her husband for a year's occupancy. 
beginning October 1, 1956, the date upon which they moved 
into the apartment. The premises, and particularly apart-
ment 2, were shown to plaintiff during the mouth of Sep-
tember. At that time she was advised that there was no 
railing yet installed around the platform or stairway leadiug 
to apartment 2 but that one would be installed later. 
The building was reached by ascending a flight of 10 steps 
leading from the public sidewalk below the building to a 
private exterior sidewalk at the top of this stairway. The 
private sidewalk was approximately 30 to 40 feet in length 
and was situated on "ground level" immediately in front of 
plaintiff's apartment. At the end of the 30 to 40-foot walk 
was a short flight of four steps leading to a small platform, 
which was immediately outside of the door of plaintiff's 
apartment. The platform, the steps, and the sidewalk, which 
extended 30 to 40 feet, all faced and were immediately con-
tiguous to the front yard of the building, which yard sloped 
down to the public sidewalk for a distance of approximately 
15 to 18 feet. 
Prior to October 1, 1956, an inspection of thl! premises wa.~ 
made by the city. Pursuant to the requirement of the city's 
building department, cement work was redone on the steps 
and platform sometime between October 1 and October 10, 
1956. During that time the workman assisted plaintiff over 
the new cement. 
A contract had been let by Rollefson to a subcontractor 
o 
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for the fabrication and installation of a railing around the 
platform and steps. This was to be done after all other work 
on the platform and steps had been completed. 
On October 10, 1956, plaintiff had a friend, Louise Green, ; 
visiting her. Plaintiff and Louise Green were leaving plain- ' 
tiff's apartment. Plaintiff opened the door and held it for 
her friend to precede her, intending to follow immediately. 
Louise Green went out the door of apartment 2, stepped on 
the platform, made a right turn, went down the four steps 
and proceeded a distance of approximately 30 feet when she 
heard someone crying and, looking down, saw plaintiff lying 
on the public sidewalk. Louise Green did not know how plain- • 
tiff got to the sidewalk, nor could she recall the position of 
plaintiff's body with reference to the platform or the small 
flight of four steps or any portion of the 30 to 40-foot side-
walk. Thus, it was impossible to determine from her testi-
mony, or any other evidence, from what portion of the prem-
ises plaintiff commenced her fall. 
Plaintiff claimed that she stepped out of the door onto the 
platform and turned so that she was facing the door; that 
the last she remembered was pulling the door closed; and that 
the next thing she knew she was in her own apartment 
suffering from injuries. 
At the above-mentioned times the following ordinances of 
the city of Los Angeles were in force: 
"Section 91.0315. (a) Certificate Required. In order to 
safeguard life and limb, health, property, and public welfare, 
every building or structure shall conform to the construction 
requirements for the Sub-group Occupancy to be housed 
therein, or for the use to which the structure is to be put, 
as specified ...• 
"No building or structure or portion thereof shall be used 
or occupied until a Certificate of Occupancy has been issued 
therefor .... " 
"Section 91.3305, Subsection (g) ... Every exterior stair-
way shall have a handrail on the outer edge. ,Stairways more 
than four feet (4') in width shall be provided with handrails 
on each side. ' , 
"Section 91.4404 (a) Guard Rails Required. Where a 
floor, roof or deck is accessible from a stairway or doorway 
aud the floor, roof or deek is more than four feet (4') above 
the udjoiuiug" ground or floor level, a pl'oteetive guard rail 
shall be provided in such a manner as to separate completely 
the doorway from the edge of the floor, roof or deck and also 
o 
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enclose all traffic lanes and all equipment requiring periodic 
servicing. " 
The trial court fOUlld that defenliants were negligent in 
failing to provide handrails or guardrails for the steps and 
platform by the door. 
. The court also found (1) that the absence of handrails or 
guardrails did not cause plaintiff to be catapulted or thrown 
down a decline to the sidewalk or cause her to sustain severe 
or any personal injuries, and (2) that the absence of said 
handrails or guardrails, or the presence of any dangerous or 
hazardous condition for which defendants or either of them 
were responsible or accountable, was not a direct or proximate 
cause of any fall or other incident which caused injury to 
plaintiff. It entered judgment accordingly in favor of de-
fendants. 
This is the sole question necessary to determine: Does the 
record disclose that as a matter of law there was 110 evide'Me 
to sustain the trial court's finding that the proximate cause 
of plaintiff's injury was Mt the absence of handrails or guard-
rails, or any other act of defenda.nis, or either of them' 
No. These principles are here controlling: 
1. The burden rests on an appellant (plaintiff in this case) 
to show the insufficiency of the evidence where findings are 
assailed on appeal as not supported by the evidence. (Nichols 
v. Mitchell, 32 Ca1.2d 598, 600 [197 P.2d 550] ;1 Munns v. 
Stenman, 152 Cal.App.2d 543, 555 [4] [314 P.2d 67] [hear-
ing denied by the Supreme Court] ; SeaWe, l1/.c. v. Finster, 149 
Cal.App.2d 612, 619 [7] [309 P.2d 51] ; Barlin v. Barz.ill, 145 
Cal.App.2d 390, 393 [2]-[3] [302 P.2d 457]; Linehan v. 
Linehan, 134 Cal.App.2d 250, 255 [4] [285 P.2d 326] [hear-
ing denied by the Supreme Court] ; Helm v. Hess, 131 Cal. 
1In Nicho18 v. MitcheU, "'PTa, p. 600, this eourt said: "As ground for 
reversal detendants urge the insuffieieney ot the evidence to !lUstain 
the findings that the realty involved was their eommunity property, and 
not the separate property ot Mrs. Mitchell. Sueh contention requires 
clcfendants to demonstrate that there is no substantial evidence to sup-
port t.he challenged findings. As was stated in the oft-cited ease of 
Crawford v. Soothern Pacific Co., 3 Ca1.2d 427, at page 429 [45 P.2d 183]: 
' ..• the power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determina-
tion as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or 
uTlcontradicted, ' which will support the findings, and when 'two or 
more inferences can be reasonably deduced trom the facts, the reviewing 
court is without power to substitute its deduetions for those of the trial 
court.' (See, also, Raggio v. Mallory, 10 Ca1.2d 7:!:1. 72!i r70 P.2d GoOl; 
Fischer v. Keen, 43 Cal.App.2d 244, 248 [110 P.2d 693]; Lahcrty v. 
Connell, 04 Cal.App.2d 355, 357 [148 P.2d 895]; Wuest Y. Wue.st, 72 Cal. 
App.2d 101, 104 [164 P.2d 32].)" 
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App.2d 251, 255 [280 P.2d 155] ; Wallace v. Thompson, 129 i 
Cal.App.2d 21, 22 [1] (276 P.2d 108] ; Kircknavy v. Levet, 
127 Cal.App.2d 586, 588 [2] [274 P.2d 161] ; Rosati v. Hei-
numn, 126 Cal.App.2d 51, 54 [2] [271 P.2d 953] ; Furst v. 
Scharer, 119 Cal.App.2d 605,610 [5] [260 P.2d 198); Indus-
trjal In.dem. Co. v. Golden State Co., 117 Cal.App.2d 519, 538 
[17] [256 P.2d 677]; Curtiss v. McGowan, 109 Cal.App.2d 
436,438 [240 P.2d 997] ; Trancoso v. Trallcoso, 96 Cal.App.2d 
797, 798 [2] [216 P.2d 172] ; Cleverd011 v. Gmy, 62 Cal.App. 
2d 612,619 [8] [145 P.2d 95] [hearing denied by the Supreme 
Court] ; Estate of Comino, 55 Cal.App.2d 806, 810 [1] [131 
P.2d 599 J; Bedford v. Pacific S. W. Corp., 121 Cal.App. 
162, 163 [1] [8 P.2d 558] ; Bayside Land Co. v. Dabney, 90 
Cal.App. 126, 130 [4] [265 P. 566] [hearing denied by the 
Supreme Court].) 
2. In order to warrant a judgment for negligence, the 
plaintiff must prove (i) that the defendant has committed 
a wrongful act and (ii) that said wrongful act was the proxi-
mate cause of plaintiff's injury. It is not sufficient that the 
evidence raises merely a conjecture, a suspicion, or speculation 
that the defendant has committed a wrongful act.2 
"In NU1Ineley v. EdgOlf' Hotel, 36 Ca1.2d 493, 498 [225 P.2d 497], this 
eourt said: "Furthermore, no liability ean be predicated upon non· 
compliance with a statutory eommand if the act or omission had no I 
causal connection with the plaintiff's injury. (Blodgett ,'. B. H. Dycu 
Co., 4 Ca1.2d 511, 513 [50 P.2d 801]; Wohlenberg v. Malcewicz, 56 Cal. 
App.2d 508, 512 [133 P.2d 12].) Otherwise stated, ' •.• the act or 
omission must proximately cause or contribute to the injury.' (Hitson v. 
Dwyer, 61 Cal.App.2d 803, 808 [143 P.2d 952].) In the Blodgett case, 
the plaintiff sustained injury from falling down a stairway which, in 
violation of an ordinance, was not equipped with a center handrail. In 
affirming a judgment of nonsuit the court said: 'The evidence shows that 
the lack of the handrail was neither the proximate nor any cause of 
plaintiff's fall. Any violation of the ordinancc b,. the (lefendant would, 
therefore, be immaterial.' " 
In Hill v. Matthews Paint Co., 149 Cal.App.2d 714, 723 [308 P.2d 
865], the court said: "(1) To be entitled to n judgment based on neg· 
ligence, plaintiff must prove that defendant's act of wrongful omission 
is the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. (Valdez v. Taylor .&uto· 
mobile Co., 129 Cal.App.2d 810, 821 [278 P.2d 91]; Holmes v. Moesser, 
120 Cal.App.2d 612, 614 [262 P.2d 27].) (2) The burden of proof. 
devolves on plaintiff to show the causal connt'ction betweon the allegeu 
negligence and the resulting injury. (Petersen v. Lewis, 2 Cal.2d 569, 
572 [42 P.2d 311]; McKellar v. Pendergast, ti8 Cal.App.2d 485, 489 
[156 P.2d 950].) (3) Where the negligence proved is not fastened to 
the particular injury for which recovery is sought. • the ease stand~ 
exactly as if no negligence lIad bet'n proven.' (Pllckllaber v. SOllth~f"fl 
Pac. Co., 132 Cal. 363, 364 [64 P. 480]; SP"llc,'r Y. Beatty Satlt'ay 
Sca.ffo/d Co., 141 Cal.App.2d 87;;, 880 [:!97 P.::!d 746]; Davis v. Lanp, 
24 Cn1.App.2d 400. 40;; [75 P.2d.565].) (·n The qucRtion of wllether 
plaintiff has sl1stainc.l the burden of establishing thnt defendant's neg· 
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3. Where llO evidellce, or insufficient evidence, is introduced 
on an issue, the finding on that issue must be against the party 
who has the burden of proof. (Rancho Santa Margarita v. 
Vail, 11 Ca1.2d 501, 543 [15] [81 P.2d 533]; Estate of Mc-
'Kenna, 143 Cal. 580, 592 [77 P. 461] ; Walbergh v. Moudy, 
164 Cal.App.2d 786, 790 [2] [331 P.2d 234] [hearing denied 
by the Supreme Court] ; Sullivan v. Ka1ltel, 124 Cal.App.2d 
723,725 [2] [269 P.2d 175].) 
Applying the foregoing rules to the facts in the present 
case, the record discloses that there was a question of fact 
presented to the trier of fact, to wit, was defendants' failure 
to provide protective handrails or guardrails the proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injuries' The trier of fact found that it 
was not. This finding is supported by the record, for these 
reasons: 
First: The agreed statement of fact contains the following: 
". . . there is no evidence in the entire record showing or 
tending to show the cause of plaintiff's injuries. "3 
ligence was the cause in fact from which his injury resulted is ordinarily 
for the trier of the facts. (Basin Oil Co. v. Baash-R088 Tool Co., 125 
Cal.App.2d 578, 603 [271 P.2d 122]; Beef!. v. Lummus Co., 76 Cal.App.2d 
288, 294 [173 P.2d 34].) (5) When there is evidence that the injury 
may be reasonably attributed to a cause for which no liability attaches 
to defendant, it is proper to find against plaintiff on the issue of neg-
ligence." 
In Prosser on Torts (2d ed. 1955), page 222, it is said: "On the 
issue of the fact of causation, as on other issues essential to his ease, 
the plaintiff has the burden of proof. He nlUst introduce evidence which 
affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than 
not that the conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in the 
result. A mere possibility of BUch causation is not enough; and when 
the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the prob-
abilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court 
to direct a verdict for the defendant." 
(Bee to the same effect Burtt v. Banlc of California Nat. ABm., 211 
Cal. 548, 551 [2] [296 P. 68]; Mar8iglia v. Dosier, 161 Cal. 403, 405 
[119 P. 505]; Puclchaber v. Bouthern Pacific Co., 132 Cal. 363, 364 
et seq. [64 P. 480]; Towle v. Pacific Impr01Jement Co., 98 Cal. 342, 346 
[33 P. 207]; Holme8 v. Moe88Br, 120 Cal.App.2d 612, 614 [1] [262 P.2d 
27] [hearing denied by the Supreme Court]; Neuber v. Royal Realty 
Co., 86 Cal.App.2d 596, 630 [25] [195 P.2d 501] [hearing denied by 
the Supreme Court]; MeKellar v. Pendergast, 68 Cal.App.2d 485, 489 
[2a] [156 P.2d 950].) • 
·On page 3 et seq. of the Agreed Statement appears the following: 
., On October 10, 1956, plaintiff, Dorothy Burdette, claims that she had 
a friend, Louise Green, visiting her. Plaintiff and Louise Green were 
leaving plaintiff's apartment and plaintiff testifie<l that she opened 
the door and held it for ber said friend to precede ber, intending to follow 
immediately thereafter. Louise Green went out the cloor of Apartment 
#2, which door entered into the apartment, stepped on the platform, 
made a right turn, went down the four steps and proceeded a distance 
of approximately 30 feet, at which time she heard someone crying, and 
o 
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Where there is an agreed statement of fact, the appellat.u 
court will assume for all purposes of reviewing the action of 
the trial court that the agreed statement contains a correct. 
statement of what took place. (McMullen v. Saunders, 138 
·Cal.App.2d 554, 555 [1] [292 P.2d 282] [hearing denied by 
the Supreme Court].) 
In view of the foregoing stipulation as to the facts, the 
trial court's finding of fact in favor of defendants is sup-
ported by the record. 
Second: Plaintiff testified " ... she stepped out of the door 
on to the platform, turned so that she faced the door, and 
claims that the last thing she remembers is pulling the door 
closed. She claims that the next thing she knew she was in 
her own apartment, which was after the accident had occurred, 
and after she had been injured. " 
Therefore, under rules 2 and 3, supra, plaintiff failed to 
sustain the burden of proof in the trial court of establishing 
that defendants' negligent act was the proximate cause of 
her injury. 
So far as the record discloses, the proximate cause of plain-
tiff's fall remains unknown, the cause thereof being merely 
a matter of conjecture, suspicion, or speCUlation. So far as 
the record discloses, she may have fainted, or deliberately I 
jumped, or been shoved off the porch or walk; or her injury 
may have been proximately caused by a variety of other acts. 
Likewise, thc record is devoid of any evidence showing where 
plaintiff left the walk, which was between 30 and 40 feet in 
length. 
then looked down and saw the plaintiff down on the public sidewalk. 
Louise Green did not know how plaintiff, Dorothy Burdette, got to the 
sidewalk. The plaintiff, Dorothy Burdette, claimed that she stepped 
out of the door on to the platform, turned so that she was facing the 
door, and claims that the last she remembers is pulling the door closed. 
She claims that the nc:rl thing she knew she was in her own apartment, 
which was after the accident had occurred, and after she had been in· 
jured. There i8 no testimony in t1,e entire record showing how plaintiff, 
Dorothy Burdette, got to the public sidewalk; there is no testimony or 
evidence in the entire record to show from what point plaintiff, Dorothy 
Burdette, left the upper or gr01lnd level of the apartment house, i.e., 
whether she left the upper level from the platform, from the steps, or 
from the private sidewalk, all of which abutted the sloping front yard; 
t1,ere i8 no testimony or evidence in the entire record tending to show at 
tL.hat place on the lower or public sidewalk the plaintiff was found; plain· 
tiff '9 friend, Louise Green, was the only party who testified that plaintiff 
was on the puhlic sidewalk, and she stated t1mt she dill not observe or 
re,!,-embe~ whether p!aintiff was in line with the platform, the steps, or the 
pnvate SIdewalk whIch abutted the top of the Rlope; there is no evidence 
i" the entire record showing or tending to show the calloSe of plaintiff's 
'''juries.'' (lalies added.) 
o 
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A plaintiff cannot recover where the facts go no further 
than to establish a possibility that a defendant's negligence 
was the proximate cause of his injury. (See Petersen v. Lcll'i.~, 
2 Ca1.2d 569, 572 [2] [42 P.2d 311] ; Hill v. Matthews Paint 
Co., 149 Cal.App.2d 714, 724 [11] [308 P.2d 865] ; Spencer v. 
Beatty Salway Scaffold Co., 141 Cal.App.2d 875, 882 [4]-[5] 
[297 P.2d 746] ; McKellar v. Pe1ldergast, 68 CaLApp.2d 485, 
489 [4] [156 P.2d 950].) 
Clearly, plaintiff failed to sustain in the trial court the 
burden of proof incumbent upon her to show that any neg-
ligent act of defendants was the proximate cause of her 
injury. Therefore, an essential element of her case was not 
proven, and the trial court's finding that defendants' neg-
ligent act was not the proximate cause of her injury is fully 
sustained by the evidence. 
From the foregoing it is evident that plaintiff has failed 
to sustain the burden of proof required by rule 1 of showing 
that the finding of the trial court is, as a matter of law, con-
trary to the facts disclosed by the record and therefol'e not 
sustained by the evidence. 
Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
The petition of respondent Herbert Hischemoeller for a 
rehearing was denicd November 3, 1959. White, J., did not 
participate therein. Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., 
were of the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
